Abstract-Nowadays, the proxy blind signature is an important issue in E-commerce system. In the proxy blind signature scheme, the delegation relationship can be established between the original signer and the proxy signer. That means an original signer, due to the special reasons, delegates his signing capability to a proxy signer who can thus sign a message on behalf of the original signer. The blindness property indicates that the proxy signer does not know the content of his signing message. In the past years, many researchers have proposed proxy blind signature schemes based on DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem) and ECDLP (Elliptic Curve DLP). This paper demonstrates that Alghazzawi et al.'s and Pradhan-Mohapatra's proxy blind signature schemes based on ECDLP are insecure because both of them do not meet the unlinkability property. Therefore, we present an enhanced construction based on the ECDLP which can satisfy all security requirements of the proxy blind signature.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Mambo et al. [1] first proposed the concept of proxy signature. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer delegates his signing capability to a person named the proxy signer, who can signs the message or document on behalf of the original signer. Moreover the concept of blind signature was proposed by Chaum [2] in 1982. In a blind signature scheme, the signer cannot know the content of the message, and even the signature is revealed by the requester later, the signer still cannot link the relationship between the blind message he recorded and the blind signature.
Proxy blind signature was first proposed by Lin and Jan [3] in 2000. It combines the concept of the proxy signature and the blind signature. The proxy blind signature scheme is useful and practical in the topics of the e-commerce, such as e-voting and e-cash schemes. Since the proxy blind signature scheme focuses on both privacy and authentication, it should meet the following security properties [4] : 1) Verifiability: the proxy blind signature can be correctly verified by the arbitrary verifier. 2) Unforgeability: no one, except for the proxy signer, can produce a valid proxy blind signature. 3) Distinguishability: Both the normal signature made by Manuscript received June 1, 2013; revised August 11, 2013 . This work was supported in part by the National Science Council under the Grant NSC 102-2219-E-415-001.
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the original signer and the proxy blind signature made by the proxy signer are distinguishable. 4) Identifiability: anyone can confirm the identities of the original signer and the proxy signer. 5) Nonrepudiation: Both the original signer and the proxy signer cannot later falsely claim that they have not performed the signing procedures. 6) Unlinkability: After the requester revealing the unblinded version signature for the verification, the proxy signer (or the original signer) unable to link the relevance between the blinded message he signed and the revealed signature. 7) Prevention of misuse: The proxy key pair should be used only for creating proxy signature, which conforms to delegation information. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), proposed by Koblitz [5] and Miller [6] in 1985, is an important mathematical technique in public key cryptosystem. The key size of ECC is much smaller than other cryptosystems like RSA encryption or Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme. Since the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem cannot be solved by the subexponential time algorithm, the strength-per-key-bit in elliptic curve systems is substantially greater than one in conventional discrete logarithm systems.
The security of our system is based on ECDLP. The main advantage of ECC is that it provides the same security level with smaller key size. In 2002, by applying Schnorr blind signature, Tan et al. [7] proposed a new proxy blind signature schemes based on DLP and ECDLP. Afterwards, Wang and Wang [8] proposed a proxy blind signature scheme based on ECDLP in 2005. However, Yang and Yu [9] proved that Wang and Wang's scheme did not meet the security properties and proposed an improved proxy blind signature scheme in 2008. Nevertheless, their scheme does not satisfy the unforgeabilty property. In 2009, Qi and Wang [10] proposed a proxy blind signature scheme based on Factoring and ECDLP, but their scheme is still insecure since it cannot meet the unforgeability and unlinkability properties. Later Pradhan-Mohapatra [4] and Alghazzawi et al. [11] also proposed new proxy blind signatures based on ECDLP, and they claimed their schemes are secure and efficient. In this paper, we will show that their schemes are insecure against linkability attacks. Up to now, for our best knowledge, there is no secure and practical proxy blind signature scheme based on ECDLP security assumption. This paper intends to propose a new enhanced construction on it and shows the security evaluation of the proposed scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First in Section II we briefly describe the theory of Elliptic Curve. Next we review two proxy blind signature schemes based on Security Analysis and Enhanced Construction on ECDLP-Based Proxy Blind Signature Scheme
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International Journal of e-Education, e-Business, e-Management and e-Learning, Vol. 4, No. 1, February 2014 ECDLP in Section III. In Section IV, we demonstrate that both schemes listed in Section III are insecure, and also present a new enhanced construction in Section V. Then we show the security analysis of our proposed scheme in Section VI and the performance comparison is shown in Section VII. Finally Section VIII gives the concluding remarks and future works.
II. ELLIPTIC CURVES OVER FINITE FIELD
In Koblitz's article [5] , the concepts of elliptic curves are introduced. We simply explain them as follows. The elliptic curve can be represented as the equation:
where a, b Є p F , and 32 4 27 0 ab  .
An elliptic curve group consists of the points on the curve and a special point O, and elliptic curves are additive groups. Suppose that P = 11 ( , ) xy and Q = 22 ( , ) xyare two different points on an elliptic curve E. Then to add P and Q, we can obtain the point denoted R = 33 ( , ) xythrough the following equation: 
Moreover, suppose given two known points P and Q, we want to find a number k such that Q= k· P, where k is a very large number regarded as the private key, finding the value of k is difficult. Therefore, it is called the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. The point Q can be calculated as the equation: 2) The original signer sends () , oo rs to the proxy signer through a secure manner.
3) When the proxy signer receives () , oo rs from the original signer, he checks the following equation:
If the equation holds, the proxy signer accepts the proxy delegation, otherwise he rejects it. 2) The requester randomly chooses two blinding factors a and b, and then he computes . 
2) Blind signing stage
and sends the blind message e to the proxy signer. 3) After receiving e, the proxy signer computes ( 
A. Analysis of Alghazzawi et al.'s Scheme
Suppose that the proxy signer records all messages he signed ( , , ) . m e S is revealed to the public by the requester, the proxy signer can try to find the corresponding signing record by computing the blinding and unblinding equations of their scheme. Refer to (7) and (8) ii eS  is the signing record of the proxy signer. Therefore the proxy signer knows all the parameters. After finding the two blinding factors a and b, refer to (6) and (9) 
B. Analysis of Pradhan and Mohapatra's Scheme
to discover the linkability between the revealed proxy blind signature and his recording blind message. Thus Pradhan and Mohapatra's scheme is also insecure since it is also unable to resist against linkability attack.
III. THE ENHANCED CONSTRUCTION ON THE ECDLP-BASED PROXY BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we propose an enhanced construction which can meet the security requirements of proxy blind signature (also see Fig. 1 ). .
Proxy Delegation Stage
If R R m to the requester.
2) The requester randomly chooses three blinding factors a,b and c, then he computes . 
and sends the blind message e to the proxy signer.
3) After receiving e, the proxy signer computes mod 
Verification Stage
The verifier verifies the validity of the proxy blind signature by checking the following equation. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we demonstrate that our proposed construction method can satisfy the security requirements of the proxy blind signature according to the definitions in [4] .
A. Verifiability
The verifier can verify the proxy blind signature by checking the equation of (28).
The correctness of the proxy blind signature is shown as follows. C. holds, meaning the proxy signer unable to trace the proxy blind signaturewith the corresponding signature transcript.
G. Prevention of Misuse
Our proposed construction method can avoid proxy key pair misuse since the warrant m w includes the identity information of the original signer and the proxy signer, message type to be signed by the proxy signer, delegation period, etc. With the proxy key, the proxy signer cannot sign messages that have not been authorized by the original signer.
In summary, we show that our construction based on ECDLP is secure because it can achieve the unlinkability property such that our scheme satisfy all the security requirements of the proxy blind signature.
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the performance of our proposed scheme and the previous schemes. As shown in Table I , the notations of M and A denote the computational costs for multiplication and addition in elliptic curve (additive group) respectively. Moreover, H denotes the generic hash operation. It can be seen that although our scheme has three multiplications more than the previous schemes of [4] and [11] , their schemes are insecure due to the forgery and/or linkability attacks while our proposed scheme can resist against these threats. From the view point of practicality, our scheme can meet the security requirements of proxy blind signature and provide acceptable performance compared with the other schemes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have indicated that Alghazzawi et al.'s [11] and Pradhan-Mohapatra's [4] signature schemes based on ECDLP are insecure, because they cannot satisfy the unlinkability properties. Thus, we propose an enhanced construction in blind signing stage which can meet the security requirements of the proxy blind signature. In the future work, we are planning to extend this construction technique to apply it on other kinds of digital signature schemes and their corresponding applications. 
